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TAKING A MULLIGAN: THE SPECIAL CHALLENGES
OF NARRATIVE CREATION IN THE
POST-CONVICTION CONTEXT
DONALD R. CASTER* AND BRIAN C. HOWE**
INTRODUCTION
“History is written by the victors” is a common phrase used to describe
the sentiment that the victorious party to a conflict will have the power to
write the history of that conflict. In the courtroom, however, the opposite of
that causal relationship exists: the party who can successfully create the most
compelling history of the litigated dispute will emerge as the victor. In this
Essay, we discuss the myriad impacts of race and racism on the criminal justice system in the United States. First, we address the structural advantages
afforded to the prosecutor in the American criminal justice system. The primary advantage is that the prosecution presents its case first and is able to
construct the narrative that will dominate a trial. We also address how the
structural advantages may serve to distort the facts of a case and how this
distortion may remain in effect even through the appellate phases of litigation. Finally, we examine the challenges faced by post-conviction counsel in
replacing the existing narrative with a new one that creates a compelling case
for relief. The creation of a provable, alternative narrative is particularly important for a defendant in post-conviction proceedings due to the deference
afforded by reviewing courts to an underlying criminal judgment. Indeed,
the history of a particular litigation may be a crucial part of the new narrative.
The need to excise the current narrative and begin again must be made clear
to a reviewing court.
I. RACE, NARRATIVE CREATION, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Any real understanding of the workings of the American criminal justice
system must include an understanding of the impact of race on that system.
Racial disparities in the criminal justice system are well-documented and understood. Black men are two to three times more likely to be arrested during
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their lifetimes than white men.1 Once arrested, black men are more likely to
be charged than white men.2 Several studies have demonstrated that race
plays a significant role in sentencing.3 Racial disparities are particularly
acute in capital cases.4 And, race does not impact only the selection of and
results for defendants. While national statistics are sparse, a recent study of
California prosecutors’ offices found that whites are “heavily overrepresented” among California prosecutors.5 The study, conducted by researchers
at the Stanford Criminal Justice Center, utilized self-reported data from district attorneys’ offices in fifty-two California counties, which comprise about
ninety-eight percent of California’s population.6 Data obtained from the district attorneys were then compared against United States Census data.7 California does not appear to be an outlier when compared with the rest of the
United States: only eight percent of Assistant United States Attorneys are
black.8 The lack of diversity among America’s prosecutors can hardly be
surprising: as of the most recent Census in 2010, whites accounted for eightyeight percent of attorneys across the country.9 The significance of racial disparities in prosecutors’ offices becomes even larger in light of recent scholarship that emphasizes the role individual prosecutors play in creating or addressing systemic problems.10 Mass incarceration, a phenomenon that has
1. William Y. Chin, Racial Cumulative Disadvantage: The Cumulative Effects of Racial Bias
at Multiple Decision Points in the Criminal Justice System, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 441, 444
(2016).
2. See, e.g., Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution: Early Assessments and StateLevel Strategies, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1551, 1628 (2012) (“After all, whites and blacks use illegal
drugs at the same rates, yet African-Americans are many times more likely to be stopped, searched,
arrested, charged, convicted, and sentenced to prison for drug crimes.”).
3. See Chin, supra note 1, at 445–46 (citing studies showing the impact of the sentencing
judge’s race, the defendant’s complexion, and the defendant’s race on sentencing).
4. See Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. L.
REV. 807, 811–12 (2008) (“The current research suggests that the race of the defendant and victim
are both pivotal in the capital of capital punishment: death was more likely to be imposed against
black defendants than white defendants, and death was more likely to be imposed on behalf of white
victims than black victims.”).
5. KATHERINE J. BIES ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STUCK IN THE ‘70S: THE
DEMOGRAPHICS OF CALIFORNIA PROSECUTORS 10 (2015), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Stuck-in-the-70s-Final-Report.pdf.
6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 8–9.
9. AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/lawyer-demographics-tables-2015.authcheckdam.pdf.
10. See, e.g., SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 147–48
(2016) (arguing prosecutors are responsible for increased reliance on guilty pleas rather than jury
trials for disposition of criminal cases); Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice
System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 203 (2007) (“Unwarranted
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captured the attention of America’s political class recently, also has a racial
component.11
Race also plays less obvious roles in the criminal justice system. A
growing body of scientific evidence points to the inaccuracy of eyewitness
identifications, particularly by those who attempt to identify the perpetrator
of a crime when that perpetrator is a stranger of a different race.12 Additionally, race can infest a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges in ways that
cannot come to light until years after the fact.13 When everything that is
known about how race and racism influence the criminal justice system is
taken together, a conclusion emerges: the system is “drastically broken.”14
This is the backdrop, then, against which the creation of narratives in
the criminal justice system must be understood. To talk about narrative creation in the criminal justice system is to talk about stories told disproportionately about black people, but told predominantly by white people. This is
why defense counsel must make use of the opportunity afforded in the postconviction context to “take a mulligan”—to redo what the criminal justice
system has done in a way that is fair to a defendant and that offers a story
free of racial and structural frames and biases.
II. NARRATIVE CREATION IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL
The importance of legal storytelling during a criminal trial is well-documented.15 Bar journals—aimed at practitioners—are replete with articles
about how best to persuade through narrative creation at trial.16 Defense attorneys are expected to develop a narrative in their preparation for trial: “Developing a theory of the case that encompasses the best interests of the client

racial disparities cannot be eliminated without the active participation of prosecutors.”); John F.
Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239, 1240–41 (2012)
(arguing that individual prosecutors are responsible for increased rates of incarceration).
11. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLOR BLINDNESS 187–89 (rev. ed. 2012).
12. See generally John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 210 (2001).
13. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) (reversing a nearly thirty-year-old conviction after prosecutors’ voir dire notes showing evidence of racial bias in jury selection were discovered).
14. Stephen J. Fortunato Jr., Judges, Racism, and the Problem of Actual Innocence, 57 ME. L.
REV. 481, 482–83 (2005).
15. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (1995)
(noting that “[l]egal storytelling enmeshes narrative tension or dissonance in the conventions of
advocacy”).
16. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, For Effective Persuasion, Don’t Neglect the Narrative, J.
KAN. B. ASS’N, Apr. 2015, at 12, 12; Heather J. E. Simmons, Practical Magic: How the Ancient
Art of Storytelling Can Make Us Better Lawyers, MICH. B.J., Aug. 2015, at 52, 52; Sunwolf, Talking
Story in Trial: The Power of Narrative Persuasion, CHAMPION, Oct. 2000, at 26, 26.

2017]

TAKING A MULLIGAN

773

and the realities of the client’s situation will help counsel evaluate various
choices throughout representation . . . .”17
The use of narratives in trials is not a recent phenomenon, and its long
history is well-documented in legal scholarship.18 As at least one scholar has
pointed out, however, that narrative creation does not necessarily assist the
trier of fact in reaching a just or correct outcome:
[T]he persuasiveness of a story does not turn on its truth. It turns
on its narrative rationality—its logical coherence, its correspondence to audience expectations. This is problematic in a legal context because we want listeners, be they juries, judges, clients, or
even opposing parties, to be influenced by the truth. In the legal
context, truth matters. If stories can persuade whether they’re true
or not, that’s not good. If lawyers tell stories that are coherent but
false, they cross the line from persuasion to manipulation.19
The potential of a false narrative to persuade a factfinder can be particularly problematic in the criminal setting. A factually untrue narrative that is
accepted by a jury or judge results in a wrongful conviction.20
The widespread understanding of the importance of narrative creation
should be of interest. After all, no formal rule requires a prosecutor (or defense attorney) to utilize storytelling to secure a conviction (or an acquittal).
To convict a defendant, the prosecution must establish all of the elements of
the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.21 Neither criminal procedural rules nor evidentiary rules speak of storytelling. Instead, telling a story
is the method by which the prosecution meets its constitutional burden, and
the procedural and evidentiary rules establish limits on the prosecution’s storytelling methods.
Because the law focuses only on the prosecution’s burden, and not that
how to practically meet—and combat—this burden through the creation of a
narrative, the American criminal justice system gives the prosecution significant advantages in creating a dominant trial narrative. In jurisdictions where

17. NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION 61 (1995); see also, e.g., Anthony Natale, Theory and Themes/Storytelling 4 (unpublished manuscript) (Jan. 8, 2015) (on file with authors) (defining “theory of the case” as “a
positive, affirmative statement as to what really occurred and what the law directs should happen to
an individual who has been accused in this particular situation”).
18. See, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, Story and Transcription in the Trial of John Brown, 6 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1994).
19. Steven J. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist? An Essay on the Ethical Limits of
Applied Legal Storytelling, 7 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 63, 68 (2010).
20. Ralph Grunewald, The Narrative of Innocence, or, Lost Stories, 25 L. & LITERATURE 366,
368–69 (2013).
21. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–62 (1970).
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voir dire is conducted by counsel rather than the bench, for example, the prosecution is the first to address prospective jurors. The prosecution is the first
to deliver an opening statement. The prosecution puts on its witnesses first,
before the defense is able to call witnesses who may provide compelling,
defense-friendly narratives, such as an alibi or a justification. In many jurisdictions, the prosecution delivers the first closing argument and is entitled to
speak to the jury last through rebuttal. In addition to all of these significant
advantages, the prosecution controls the timing of when the case goes to trial
and the preparatory advantages inherent in holding those reins. The defense,
on the other hand, must scramble to construct its narrative in the time between
the initiation of charges and the beginning of a trial.
Despite the formal burden placed on the prosecution, the practical impact of giving the prosecution the upper hand in narrative creation may pose
an impossible challenge for defense counsel:
Unaware of narrative dynamics, jurors are susceptible to dramatizing elements that are introduced in court and to constructing
their stories from case-specific information acquired at trial and
their expectations about what makes a complete story. What reasons, for example, exist to shave a beard? Kevin Byrd, who was
wrongfully convicted of a rape, shaved his goatee the day before
he got arrested. He claimed that he simply got tired of it, but the
prosecutor contextualized this event differently: the defendant
changed his facial features. In court, this element became “dramatic” although it was simply a random coincidence. If a prior
conviction is introduced in court, it can have the same dramatic
effect. The defendant is portrayed as a specific “type,” as someone
who typically commits crimes (even if these crimes are unrelated
to the one in question). The jury is not equipped to disregard this
kind of information.22
Despite the importance of narrative creation in persuading a jury, the
decision to engage in legal storytelling is not an automatic one for defense
counsel. Defense counsel must weigh the decision to tell a client’s story in
the most persuasive manner possible alongside several other factors, often
overlooked in the scholarly literature. For example, counsel must consider
whether the factfinder is a judge or a jury, the identity of the factfinder, the
skills of the assigned prosecutor, the viability of the defendant’s narrative,

22. Grunewald, supra note 20, at 380 (footnotes omitted) (citing John H. Blume, Every Juror
Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense (Cornell
Legal Studies Research Paper No 06-042, 2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=942653).
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and the witnesses on each side.23 And, defense counsel should consider how
his or her storytelling efforts at trial may play out on appeal.24 Many of these
considerations are also important to prosecutors, who are also striving to craft
a narrative.25
A stark picture of the criminal justice system thus emerges. A defendant
is disproportionately likely to be a person of color. Prosecuting decisions,
however, are probably going to be in the hands of white people. Should a
defendant decide to risk a trial,26 he will face a prosecution team that has
already crafted a narrative. Once the trial begins, the prosecution team will
have several built-in advantages in selling its story to the trier of fact. In
particular, the prosecution sells its story first, providing the opportunity for
that narrative to become embedded in the jury’s or judge’s consciousness.
And while defense counsel will (or should) understand the persuasive value
of narratives and the value in crafting a counter-narrative that tells the defendant’s story, other considerations may force him to forego such a strategy.
Against such a backdrop, it can hardly be surprising that wrongful convictions—stemming from the acceptance of a false narrative—are increasingly
common.27 A criminal trial is structured in such a way as to favor the perpetuation of the prosecution’s narrative. And even if that narrative is based
on distorted evidence, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to un-tell, given
the structural restraints of a criminal trial.
III. THE NARRATIVE ON APPEAL
Once a defendant is convicted, the chances that he can successfully defeat the prosecution’s narrative on appeal become even slimmer. This is because significant structural barriers are imposed to protect the narrative that
prevails at trial. Should a defendant challenge a trial court’s decision to admit
or exclude evidence, for instance, he will need to establish that the trial court
abused its discretion.28 A defendant who argues to an appellate court that the
23. Todd A. Berger, A Trial Attorney’s Dilemma: How Storytelling as a Trial Strategy Can
Impact a Criminal Defendant’s Successful Appellate Review, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 297, 318 (2012).
24. Id.
25. See generally JOHN BOBO, THE BEST STORY WINS (AND OTHER ADVICE FOR NEW
PROSECUTORS) (2010).
26. While not the subject of this Essay, the decision to go to trial itself is both fraught with
consequences and increasingly rare. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocentpeople-plead-guilty/.
27. See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015 1 (2016),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf
(noting
that 2015 saw a “record number” of exonerations in the United States).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Guerrier, 428 F.3d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 2005); People v. Waidla, 996
P.2d 46, 61 (Cal. 2000); People v. Powell, 55 N.E.3d 435, 440 (N.Y. 2016) (citing People v. Schulz
829 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (N.Y. 2005)).
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prosecution’s narrative was supported by evidence sufficient to challenge a
conviction faces an even more difficult challenge in most jurisdictions. Consider this recent description of what a defendant must do to successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him on direct appeal from a
federal conviction:
Any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence comes with “a
heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable, burden.” To prevail, [a defendant] “must convince us that even after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact
could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”29
The task is no less onerous in most state appellate systems, where a trial
court will similarly review the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution.30 Should a defendant convicted in state court seek federal review of
his conviction through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, federal law
makes challenging his conviction even more difficult. A federal court is
bound to accept the factual findings of a state court unless the proceedings in
state court “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”31 In deciding whether a state court’s factual determination was
“unreasonable,” the habeas court is bound by the factual record as it existed
at the time of the state court adjudication.32
Given the structural barriers to the presentation of a defense-friendly
narrative on appeal, the manner in which appellate courts interpret the trial
record is predictable. Judges write their opinions to support what is, more

29. United States v. Dessart, 823 F.3d 395, 403 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted) (quoting
United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2010)).
30. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 652 N.E.2d 721, 732 (Ohio 1995) (noting that “when a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the state’s evidence, ‘the relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’” (first quoting State v.
Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492, 494 (Ohio 1991), superseded by constitutional amendment as recognized in
State v. Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio 1997); and then citing State v. Waddy, 588 N.E.2d 819, 825
(Ohio 1992)).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2012).
32. In Cullen v. Pinholster, the Supreme Court barred the expansion of the state court record
in habeas proceedings:
We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before
the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the
past tense, to a state-court adjudication that “resulted in” a decision that was contrary to,
or “involved” an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking
language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It
follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same
time—i.e., the record before the state court.
563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011).
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often than not, their ultimate conclusion: that the lower court should be affirmed. In the criminal context, that means deferring substantially to the trial
court’s and prosecution’s framing of a case. Two examples—one made famous by popular culture, the other noted by a late Supreme Court Justice—
aptly illustrate the point.
In late 2015, the documentary series Making a Murderer33 ignited the
passions—and furies—of not just legal practitioners and jurists, but the general public. The series, released on the online streaming service Netflix, told
the story of how Steven Avery and Brendan Dassey were convicted of the
murder of Teresa Halbach.34 By the time he was charged with that murder,
Avery had a history with the criminal justice system; in 1985, he was convicted of rape, only to be freed based on the results of DNA testing eighteen
years later.35 Avery returned to the same community in which he grew up—
the same community in which he was wrongly convicted of rape and whose
police department he sued following his exoneration.36
In affirming Avery’s murder conviction, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals explains matter-of-factly why he was a suspect:
Halbach’s clients included Auto Trader magazine. In the morning
of October 31, 2005, Steven Avery called Auto Trader magazine
to arrange for Halbach to photograph a vehicle at the salvage yard.
Halbach had taken photos of vehicles at the Avery salvage yard on
five prior occasions. At the time of her disappearance, it was believed that Halbach was last seen taking photos at Avery’s Auto
Salvage.37
Indeed, the court leaves little room for doubt that the prosecution presented a strong case against Avery:
During the course of the search, the police found, among other
things, burned bone fragments, including skull fragments, in and
around a burn pit behind Avery’s garage with DNA consistent with
that of Halbach; blood in the front area of Halbach’s vehicle that
was later determined to have come from Avery; blood in the cargo
area of the vehicle that was later determined to have come from
Halbach; and remnants of a cell phone, Palm Pilot and camera in a
burn barrel in Avery’s yard of the same models owned by Halbach.
While conducting a sixth search of Avery’s trailer on November 8,
33. Making a Murderer (Netflix Dec. 18, 2015).
34. Jethro Nededog, Everything You Need to Know from “Making a Murderer” if You Don’t
Want to Spend 10 Hours Watching, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 14, 2016, 3:01 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/netflix-making-a-murderer-recap-2016-1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. State v. Avery, 804 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011).
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officers discovered the key to Halbach’s vehicle in Avery’s bedroom. The key was later determined to have Avery’s DNA on it.
In a search conducted in March 2006, after Avery had been
charged, police recovered a nearly intact bullet and bullet fragments from Avery’s garage that came from a rifle found in Avery’s
trailer and contained DNA belonging to Halbach.38
Making a Murderer, though, provides a different story. In the fourth
installment of the series, we learn that only Avery’s DNA was present on
Halbach’s keys.39 One would have expected that, since the keys originally
belonged to Halbach, her DNA would be present on the keys as well.40 Moreover, the provenance of the keys is questionable because the police searched
Avery’s house several times before finding the keys underneath a pair of
shoes in Avery’s bedroom.41 The officer who found the keys was from the
department that was being sued by Avery, despite the conflict of interest his
involvement would seem to pose.42
Even if one discounts the discovery of Halbach’s keys, certainly the
presence of Avery’s blood in Halbach’s car is strong, circumstantial evidence
of guilt. Except that this evidence, too, may have its own story. Avery’s trial
attorneys learned that a vial of Avery’s blood—which had been collected and
preserved in connection with his wrongful conviction for rape—may have
been subject to tampering.43 The vial’s lid had a small, syringe-sized hole.44
Eliminate the keys and Avery’s blood, however, and strong evidence of
guilt arguably remains. The victim’s car was found on Avery’s sprawling
property regardless of what was inside of that car.45 Interestingly enough,
however, the car is also the subject of a subplot. Two days before the car was
“discovered” by volunteers searching the area for evidence pertaining to Halbach’s whereabouts, a police officer—again, from the department being sued
by Avery—called into police dispatch with the license plate number of that
car.46 When he was told by a dispatcher the car belonged to Halbach, he
immediately replied, “’99 Toyota, right?”47 At trial, he was unable to explain
how he knew the make of Halbach’s car.48

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 221.
Nededog, supra note 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The presence of a bullet with Halbach’s DNA in Avery’s garage, nonetheless, posits a compelling argument for Avery’s guilt. That argument is
weakened, however, by critical, additional information: the bullet was found
only on the fifth search of Avery’s garage—discovered by, of course, a member of the law enforcement agency being sued by Avery—and the forensic
scientist who tested the bullet for DNA contaminated the sample with her
own DNA.49
The appellate decision affirming Avery’s conviction neglects to emphasize facts that, as depicted in Making a Murderer, cumulatively form a narrative supporting reasonable doubt, if not outright innocence.50 The appellate
court does not mention that one of the principal agencies responsible for investigating the crime had previously been responsible for wrongfully convicting Avery and was being sued for it.51 It leaves out questions about how
evidence was found.52 It offers no hint that the defense argued that some
evidence may have been planted, and other evidence may have been subject
to shoddy forensic testing.53 Instead, the appellate court tells a narrative that
leads to the legal conclusion it ultimately reaches: Avery was guilty of the
murder of Teresa Halbach.54
For many, Making a Murderer was a lesson about the injustice present
in the American criminal justice system.55 But for both the legal profession
and the academy, it should be a primer on the importance of narrative. Overall, very few facts were presented in the documentary that were not presented
to the jury. But based on accounts in the popular press, the reaction to the
series was overwhelmingly sympathetic to Avery, a convicted murderer.56
49. Id.
50. Making a Murderer devotees will no doubt notice other facts depicted in the show that are
not mentioned by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. The authors have not sought to provide an
exhaustive list of all such facts, but merely a representative one.
51. Nededog, supra note 34.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. State v. Avery, 804 N.W.2d 216, 242 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011).
55. To be sure, Making a Murderer has its share of critics, who believed the series told its story
unfairly. E.g., Samantha Grossman, Here’s What Was Left out of Making a Murderer, TIME (Jan.
5, 2016), http://time.com/4167699/netflix-making-a-murderer-evidence-left-out/; Daniel Victor,
Making A Murderer Left out Crucial Facts, Prosecutor Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/arts/television/ken-kratz-making-a-murderer.html?_r=0.
56. See, e.g., June Thomas, What Really Makes Making a Murderer So Good? There’s No
Narrator., SLATE (Dec. 30, 2015, 8:02 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2015/12/30/what_really_makes_making_a_murderer_so_good_unlike_serial_and_the_jinx_there.html (noting that the show convinced the author, a “woman and a cat
lover,” to “side with an accused murderer/rapist whose rap sheet involves mistreatment of a cat”);
German Lopez, Netflix’s Making a Murderer Exposes Flaws that Go Far Beyond Steven Avery’s
Trial, VOX (Jan. 15, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/1/12/10755690/netflix-making-amurderer-avery-guilty (“Netflix’s Making a Murderer has, for many, led to just one question: Is
Steven Avery innocent?”).
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The reaction provoked by Making a Murderer is at least partially caused
by the manner in which its producers chose to tell the story of Avery’s conviction. Unlike most crime procedurals—both fictional and nonfictional—
the producers were embedded with the defense team rather than the prosecution. By the time the account of Avery’s trial began, the audience may have
been predisposed to be sympathetic towards Avery, as the series recounts his
wrongful conviction and the nearly two decades he spent in prison for a crime
he did not commit.57 Ultimately, Making a Murderer presents a criminal trial
in a very different way than the American public is used to seeing one. It
tells Avery’s story in the way that defense counsel might have if he or she
could alter the structure of a trial. In the documentary, portions of the direct
testimony of government witnesses are immediately followed by the relevant,
corresponding portions of their cross-examination.58 When the documentary
presents the testimony of a key government witness, it follows that testimony
immediately with the contradictory testimony of a defense witness.59 During
normal trials, however, the jury waits hours or days (and in some notable
cases, weeks or even months) between hearing a government witness and
hearing a defense witness with a contrary opinion. Ultimately, Making a
Murderer is an excellent demonstration that the manner in which facts are
assembled can be even more persuasive than the facts themselves.
The narrative of the Avery trial may be more easily unraveled and rewoven than many criminal prosecutions, as the two co-defendants and the
victim all were white. Long-standing, institutionalized racial biases against
black defendants present in many criminal trials thus played no part in the
Avery case. Nonetheless, the documentary is a quintessential illustration of
the power of the structural advantages of the prosecuting team in American
criminal trials.
The case of Henry Lee McCollum also shows the impact that prosecution-friendly narratives can have throughout the criminal justice system.
McCollum, a black man, was convicted of rape and murder and sentenced to
death.60 The Supreme Court of North Carolina summarized the trial evidence:
The defendant, Henry Lee McCollum, gave a statement to law
enforcement officers on 28 September 1983. In this statement, the
defendant McCollum said that he saw Sabrina Buie and Darrell
Suber come out of Suber’s house at approximately 9:30 p.m. on 24
September 1983. McCollum, Chris Brown, Louis Moore and Leon
Brown joined Sabrina Buie and Darrell Suber, and the group then
57.
58.
59.
60.

Making a Murderer (Netflix Dec. 18, 2015).
Id.
Id.
State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 148 (N.C. 1993).
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went to a “little red house near the ballpark.” The five males tried
to convince Sabrina to have sexual intercourse with them, but she
refused. Two of the males went to a store and purchased some
beer. When they returned, the males discussed having sexual intercourse with Sabrina. Louis Moore refused to participate and
left.
The four remaining males and Sabrina then walked across a soybean field and sat in some bushes where they drank beer. Suber
stated that he was going to have sexual intercourse with Sabrina.
At this point, the defendant McCollum grabbed Sabrina’s right arm
and Leon Brown grabbed her left arm. Eleven-year-old Sabrina
then began to yell, “Mommy, Mommy” and “Please don’t do it.
Stop.” Suber then raped Sabrina while the defendant and Brown
held her arms. Subsequently, each man raped Sabrina while the
others held her. Leon Brown then sodomized the child while Chris
Brown held her.
After the men had raped and sodomized Sabrina, Suber said “we
got to do something because she’ll go uptown and tell the cops we
raped her. We got to kill her to keep her from telling the cops on
us.” The defendant McCollum grabbed Sabrina’s right arm while
Leon Brown grabbed her left arm. Chris Brown knelt over Sabrina’s head and pushed her panties down her throat with a stick
while Leon Brown and the defendant held her down. After determining that the child was dead, the defendant and Chris Brown
dragged her body away to a bean field to hide it from view.61
What about McCollum’s narrative? How did that fit into the court’s
rendering of the facts? The court simply stated, “[o]ther evidence introduced
at trial is discussed at other points in this opinion where pertinent to the issues
raised by the defendant.”62 Absent from the court’s factual summary is that
McCollum, nineteen years old at the time, was interrogated for five hours
without an attorney present and while his mother was not permitted to see
him.63 Moreover, McCollum recanted his confession at trial, and two of the
men mentioned in his confession were never prosecuted.64
Shortly after the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed McCollum’s
conviction, another defendant sentenced to death in a wholly unrelated case
from a different part of the county sought a writ of certiorari from the United

61. Id. at 149.
62. Id.
63. Jonathan M. Katz & Erik Eckholm, DNA Evidence Clears Two Men in 1983 Murder, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/us/2-convicted-in-1983-north-carolina-murder-freed-after-dna-tests.html.
64. Id.
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States Supreme Court following the denial of his own petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.65 The Court denied certiorari, provoking a dissent from Justice Harry Blackmun. He argued that “despite the effort of the States and
courts to devise legal formulas and procedural rules . . . the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake.”66
Justice Antonin Scalia elected to pen a concurrence responding to Justice Blackmun, apparently seeking to legitimatize the death penalty as an institution.67 In so doing, he chose the McCollum case to illustrate the utility
and fairness of the death penalty, arguing that, in light of McCollum’s conduct, any argument that the Eighth Amendment forbade the execution of
American citizens should be viewed as foreclosed:
How enviable a quiet death by lethal injection compared with
[McCollum’s crime]! If the people conclude that such more brutal
deaths may be deterred by capital punishment; indeed, if they
merely conclude that justice requires such brutal deaths to be
avenged by capital punishment; the creation of false, untextual, and
unhistorical contradictions within “the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence” should not prevent them.68
It is not hard to imagine why Justice Scalia chose the rape and murder
of Sabrina Buie to justify the death penalty. The crime was particularly brutal
and was recounted with chilling detail by the North Carolina Supreme Court;
the brevity with which McCollum’s narrative was treated, though, should be
equally chilling.69
Twenty more years would pass before the world would learn that what
McCollum had always claimed was true: the prosecution’s narrative was
false, and McCollum was innocent. In 2014, DNA evidence exonerated
McCollum and his co-defendant, implicating instead a man who lived just a
block from where Sabrina’s body was found.70
Together, the McCollum and Avery cases illustrate just how powerful
prosecution-friendly narratives can become once adopted by an appellate
court. Indeed, the narrative employed against McCollum was so persuasive
it was adopted as a justification for the imposition of the death penalty in an
unconnected case. Given the power of carefully woven and reinforced prosecutorial narratives, retelling the story in a defense-friendly way will prove
to be no easy task.
65.
1993).
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1141 (1994), denying cert to 988 F.2d 269 (5th Cir.
Id. at 1144 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1141 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1143.
State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 149 (N.C. 1993).
Katz & Eckholm, supra note 63.
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IV. DEFENSE COUNSEL’S ROLE IN RETELLING THE NARRATIVE
FOLLOWING A CONVICTION
A post-conviction narrative will inherently challenge and contradict the
existing narrative of the crime. It must also incorporate some piece of new
evidence, demonstrate its importance to the narrative, and do so in a way that
is credible and compelling.71 How can litigators present this new evidence
in a way that maximizes its credibility in the story without confusing or muddling the narrative and without being overcome by the bias “baked in” to the
already-established narrative of guilt?
The worst way to do this might be the simplest—merely add the new
evidence to the established narrative, like a footnote or a postscript. Our natural bias is to interpret new information in light of the already established
narrative.72 This “curse of knowledge” not only colors our view of the facts,
but it also encourages us to be overly confident in the conviction and underestimate the impact of new evidence.73 People become wedded to their first
impressions, known as “initial anchor values” in cognitive psychology literature.74 Adding new information—especially new information that contradicts the ultimate conclusion of the narrative—can feel especially foreign or
jarring when tacked on to the known, polished story. It may also appear convenient or incredible, like an unconvincing deus ex machina in fiction.
For new evidence to find its proper place in the narrative, the established
story must be broken down and reframed to incorporate the new evidence
naturally. Doing so will not only counter the preexisting bias against the
defendant but can also produce a genuinely compelling story in the defendant’s favor. Specifically, at least some of the inherent bias baked into the
existing narrative can be overcome by, first, returning to primary sources
when possible, second, broadening the narrative perspective and, finally,
shifting the center of gravity of the story to the new evidence.
A. Shifting Narratives in Fiction
The problem of how best to add new, contradictory information to an
established story is not unique to post-conviction litigation. Changing a
reader’s mind about a pre-existing narrative is, in effect, the idea behind a
71. See, e.g., State v. Petro, 76 N.E.2d 370 (1947) (noting that new evidence must provide a
“strong probability that the newly discovered evidence will result in a different verdict”).
72. Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
317, 331–32 (2009).
73. Id. at 332; see Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 311, 316 (2006) (finding that “people adjust insufficiently from an initial anchor value because they stop adjusting once their adjustments fall within an implicit range of plausible values”).
74. Epley & Gilovich, supra note 73, at 316.
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“changeover” in film.75 In a “changeover,” additional information is presented at the end of the narrative that casts the foundation of the entire story
preceding it in a new light.76 An effective twist in a fictional novel or film
requires an author to actually create the “curse of knowledge” bias in a
reader, only to counter it later.77 This technique introduces new evidence in
a way that is powerful and memorable, what one creative writing scholar has
called the “poetics of surprise.”78
Countering the curse of knowledge, whether in fiction or a post-conviction narrative, requires telling the initial story with care. The narrative of the
investigation and conviction “must include elements early on that are endowed with some significance that will only be visible later.”79 In fiction,
this involves subtle hints and foreshadowing about the twist to come. In the
post-conviction narrative, this involves finding and highlighting facts about
the original investigation and conviction that are especially important to the
new evidence—creating a negative space in that initial narrative that can be
filled by new evidence.
Popular fiction provides multiple examples of how powerful this technique can be. In the film The Sixth Sense, the plot primarily centers on the
relationship between Bruce Willis’s character, Dr. Malcolm Crowe, and a
young boy he is treating.80 However, significant screen time is spent on a
secondary plot involving what appears to be a strained relationship between
Dr. Crowe and his wife. The two are not speaking to each other. She silently
picks up the check at an anniversary dinner. Several times we see the wife
emotionally upset. Several times we see her comforted by another man when
she is in pain. The film lingers on these moments to the point that Dr.
Crowe’s marital problems become a significant subplot to the film.81
In fact, the entire subplot was a highly effective way to call attention to
a specific part of Dr. Crowe’s story that the screenwriter knew would look
different with new information. As the audience (and Dr. Crowe himself)
learns that Dr. Crowe is dead, the film flashes back to the scenes of marital
strife, which allow the audience to absorb the subplot in a completely new
light. Dr. Crowe’s wife’s apparent coldness is the result of the fact that she

75. Cf. Seth A. Friedman, Cloaked Classification: The Misdirection Film and Generic Duplicity, 58 J. FILM & VIDEO 16, 19–21 (2006) (identifying the revelation of Tyler Durden’s character in
the movie Fight Club as being the imagined alter ego of the narrator as an example of “changeover”).
76. Id.
77. Vera Tobin, Cognitive Bias and the Poetics of Surprise, 18 LANGUAGE & LITERATURE
155, 157 (2009).
78. Id. at 168.
79. Id. at 157.
80. THE SIXTH SENSE (Hollywood Pictures 1999).
81. Id.
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cannot see or interact with him. Her tears are not for the state of her marriage,
but for Dr. Crowe’s death. The voice of the boy is recalled, reminding Crowe
that dead people do not know they are dead. The scales fall from the viewer’s
eyes.
As exciting as post-conviction cases can be, they will rarely have such
a cinematic reveal. Still, the same basic storytelling principles apply. Newly
discovered evidence will necessarily contradict some of the evidence presented at trial. More precisely, what it contradicts is a specific interpretation
of that evidence. A good post-conviction narrative will tell the story of the
investigation and conviction in a way such that the new evidence can snap
into place in the story, recasting what readers initially believed was irrelevant
or damning evidence. This means first deconstructing the prior narrative and
re-evaluating the full landscape upon which it was built.
B. Deconstructing the Existing Narrative
As discussed above, the existing trial record is likely a result of at least
some intentional bias and filtering.82 Trial testimony is prepared and intentionally crafted by attorneys with a specific narrative in mind. A few dozen
pages of testimony will rarely capture the full scope of information contained
in an extensive investigation. And, depending on discovery practices in place
at the time, the defense may not have had access to direct evidence that could
have been used to impeach a State’s witness at trial. Gaining access to the
original police reports and witness statements is essential to recognizing and
filtering out bias that may have crept into the trial.
In fact, leaving aside intentional bias, second-hand summaries should
never be relied upon as a foundation for post-conviction narratives. Insofar
as the truth is contained in the entire record, it cannot be presented on its face
without summarizing and editing for content. No matter how pure an author’s intentions, any decision about which facts to include and which to exclude must reflect a point of view about the overall narrative. Relying on a
second-hand summary, however, increases the risk of innocently omitting
critical facts that only look important in hindsight.
It is easy to find real-world examples of how summarization can bias a
narrative. In 1975, three black men—Ricky Jackson, Kwame Ajamu, and
Wiley Bridgeman—were convicted of the murder of a white salesman in
Cleveland, Ohio.83 The case was based largely on testimony from a single
82. See supra Part II.
83. State v. Jackson, No. 36181, 1977 WL 201428, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 1977). At
the time of the trial, Kwame Ajamu’s legal name was Ronnie Bridgeman. Maurice Possley, Ricky
Jackson, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4553 (lasted updated April 11, 2016). After the trial, he changed
his name. Id.
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witness, thirteen-year-old Eddie Vernon (“Vernon”).84 All three defendants
were sentenced to death.85 Vernon’s recantation, almost forty years later,
ultimately resulted in the exoneration of all three men.86
On direct appeal of their decision, the appellate court devoted fourteen
paragraphs to the State’s case, detailing testimony from over a dozen State’s
witnesses. The sole description of the defense came in a single paragraph at
the end: “The defense offered many witnesses who contradicted parts of Eddie Vernon’s story. An alibi was also presented. At the close of all the evidence, the defense again moved for acquittal. The motion was denied.”87
In fact, these “many witnesses” included several schoolchildren who
confirmed that Vernon was on the school bus with them when the shooting
happened, not on the sidewalk mere feet from the shooting as Vernon had
testified.88 Jackson’s alibi consisted of multiple people who confirmed that
neither he nor his co-defendants were anywhere near the shooting when it
happened.89 At least one other witness, Karen Smith, had seen the actual
shooters loitering at the scene just before the shooting.90 Smith confirmed
that the men she saw were not any of the three co-defendants.91
Given this evidence, the appellate summary might be seen as some kind
of intentional effort to skew the evidence against Jackson. And as described
above, we know today that race almost certainly played a role in Jackson’s
conviction and sentence.92 There is, however, a less nefarious explanation.
The main strategy of Jackson’s attorneys on direct appeal was to attack the
sufficiency of the evidence against him.93 In evaluating that claim, the court
was required to weigh evidence in a light most favorable to the State, and had
an obligation not to consider defense witnesses in deciding whether the State
had presented a bare, prima facie case.94 The context of the claims framed
the appellate court’s story. An appellate court’s summary of the facts has its

84. Possley, supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. Ohio Man Ricky Jackson, Exonerated After 39 Years in Prison, Sues Police, NBC NEWS
(May 19, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ohio-man-ricky-jackson-exonerated-after-39-years-prison-sues-n361531.
87. Jackson, 1977 WL 201428, at *2.
88. Transcript of Record at 784, 843–44, State v. Jackson, No. CR-75-020436-B (Ohio Ct.
Common Pleas, Crim. Div., Aug. 11, 1975).
89. Id. at 914–21, 951–71, 1104–10.
90. Id. at 701–03.
91. Id. at 735–36; Kyle Swenson, What the Boy Saw, CLEVELAND SCENE (June 8, 2011),
http://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/what-the-boy-saw/Content?oid=2598138.
92. See supra note 1.
93. State v. Jackson, No. 36181, 1977 WL 201428, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 1977).
94. State v. DeHass, 227 N.E.2d 212, 213 (Ohio 1967); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319–20 (1979).
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own purpose, which, intentionally or not, may not always include a complete
and fair description of the entire trial.
Nor can a full picture of the actual crime be found in the trial record.
The record does not reflect the strong leads against other unrelated suspects,
nor could it capture those suspects’ lengthy criminal histories after Jackson’s
conviction.95 Trial testimony struggles at times to capture the predictable
way that Eddie Vernon’s story evolved over time, eliminating previous inconsistencies and incorporating information learned by police from other
sources.96 All of these facts are found in primary sources—either recorded
observations in police reports or direct witness statements. Sometimes these
facts do not make it to trial as the result of intentional trial strategy. Other
times facts might have been withheld by the State or simply missed by defense counsel. In Jackson’s case, the police file was disclosed to defense
counsel during trial, and counsel did not receive an extension to investigate
alternate suspects, questions regarding Vernon’s credibility, and tunnel vision in the police investigation.97 Whatever the circumstances of trial, a successful and accurate post-conviction narrative requires knowing and understanding these original sources whenever possible.
At first, returning to original sources might (and should) seem like a step
backward in terms of clarity. Getting closer to original sources will necessarily blur and confuse the narrative of the crime. Primary sources are often
messy and inconsistent in minor or major ways. They may show witness
testimony evolving over time. They may show police attitudes and theories
evolving over time. Various facts and statements may be frustratingly ambiguous or open to multiple interpretations. The narrative might become unwieldy and meandering in ways that might not always be helpful to the defendant.
But among that rubble are the cornerstones of the new story. The most
important kind of facts for the credibility of the new narrative are those which
may have seemed insignificant at the time the prior narrative was created, but
which might take on new significance in light of new evidence. These are
the lynchpins of the new story and will help frame not only the crime itself,
but the investigation and conviction as well.
C. Broadening the Narrative Perspective
The narrative created by an appellate court is the first “post-conviction”
narrative and often the starting point for future courts as to what happened.

95. Swenson, supra note 91.
96. Id.
97. Transcript of Record, supra note 88, at 362–63, 378.
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An appellate court will focus on the trial record, and it will present the narrative in those terms. Witness A testified to this, and Witness B testified to that.
In a post-conviction context, however, this narrative—how the conviction
happened—must be a part of the story itself. Therefore, the narrative has to
take a broader perspective. Instead of simply recounting witnesses, a potential structure might be something like the following:
1. Description of the investigation.
2. Description of the trial and conviction.
3. Revelation of new evidence.
All of these narratives orbit the central crime. But beneath the surface
must be a story about how the narrative—specifically, the false narrative—
was created during trial. The focus is not only on “what happened” in the
original crime. It must also be on how police purported to discover “what
happened.” It must be about how information was added or subtracted for
trial, about what story the jury heard, and finally how and why that story was
incomplete.98
With so many competing and often conflicting narratives, finding a single appropriate perspective can be difficult. Nonetheless, a post-conviction
narrative should avoid the temptation to divine what “actually happened” in
a third-person, omniscient sense. A play-by-play narrative of the crime—
based on a defense theory or defendant’s alibi, and without explicitly referencing factual sources—can come across as either confusing or phony.99 Police and prosecutors are quick, of course, to tell a jury the story of what “actually happened” in the crime. But one of the major themes of a postconviction narrative is that one should be suspicious of these attempts. The
only story that can accurately be told about what “actually happened” leading
up to the conviction is what actually happened in terms of the investigation
and trial. Not only will this present a less biased view of the crime, but it will
often provide a more accurate picture of how an investigation and prosecution may have gone wrong.
For similar reasons, aggressively attacking the State’s narrative during
its introduction may also backfire. Of course, in many wrongful conviction

98. DOUGLAS H. YARN, GEORGIA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE &
PROCEDURES § 5:8, Westlaw (database updated May 2016) (“Employing an ‘outsider’s view,’ or a
generalized view more prone to see decisions in their context of similarity with other situations, can
provide the basis for comparisons that may reveal the existence of bias . . . .”).
99. Because of heuristics related to anchoring, “judgments tend to be excessively influenced
by an initial impression, perspective, or value.” Epley & Gilovich, supra note 73, at 311. The initial
“impression, perspective, or value” of the reader is not the one presented by the author after the
conviction—the initial impression will come from the a priori assumption, post-conviction, that the
inmate has been convicted and is likely guilty.
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cases, there may be fairly obvious problems with the original conviction.100
But the focus of the initial story should not be an authentic presentation of
the crime; it should be an authentic presentation of the investigation and conviction. Even audiences who may not be familiar with the facts of this particular case “know” something about it; they “know” that multiple actors,
including a jury, have evaluated this evidence and found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. They may “know” the frequency of meritorious motions for
post-conviction relief is low.101 This knowledge is the foundation on which
the defendant’s new story will (or won’t) be understood.102 A defendant was
arrested, tried, and convicted, presumably by actors who were neither evil
nor grossly incompetent at every stage. If the narrative is presented in a way
such that the audience cannot understand why police arrested the suspect or
how a jury could have possibly convicted the defendant, the narrative might
seem jarring and suspicious, and it might be rejected as unconvincing.
It is important to note that adopting a broader perspective does not necessarily mean telling the same story multiple times. One of the most common
mistakes law students make in wrangling with multiple narratives, however,
is to recount each stage of the conviction from multiple perspectives in their
entirety. First, they might try to describe the basic facts of the crime from a
kind of third-person, omniscient perspective. Then they might describe the
investigation, necessarily repeating many of the earlier facts as police purport
to discover “what happened.” Then, they might give a full description of the
trial, where the same facts are often repeated a third time in the course of
describing trial testimony. These narratives are often presented unsympathetically, sometimes interspersed with the new evidence that is the subject
of the motion in order to challenge the narrative at each step.
Repeating the chronology of the crime multiple times is poor storytelling and a particularly poor way to counter the inherent biases against a defendant. Readers are likely to lose focus over the course of multiple retellings. Subtle differences in each narrative become difficult to remember
and track. Multiple complete retellings of the crime make it hard to remember where certain pieces of information first cropped up or how various actors
came to the conclusions they did. Worse, once a reader is told a particular
story, they may be overconfident that they fully understood it,103 and they
100. Recognition and resistance of the “‘official’ but unsatisfying” explanation may, to some
extent, be culturally ingrained. Friedman, supra note 75, at 24.
101. State v. Nichols, 463 N.E.2d 375, 378 (Ohio 1984) (“We are mindful that commentators
have viewed the evolution of postconviction relief in Ohio as having created a virtually futile review
process.”).
102. See Epley & Gilovich, supra note 73, at 311 (“This anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic is
assumed to underlie many intuitive judgments . . .” and “explain[s] why judgments tend to be excessively influenced by an initial impression, perspective or value.”).
103. Id. at 312–13 (discussing the effects of “anchoring”).
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may be more likely to skim a lengthy retelling of that story. Leaving key
facts to the second or third full retelling of the crime means that those facts
are likely to be lost in the mix.
A more effective and coherent narrative, where possible, should use one
single perspective to introduce the core facts of the crime and then focus only
on key themes in or differences between the other perspectives as they arise.
Facts should be introduced as they were discovered, with particular attention
paid to how police and the jury reached a conclusion of guilt, and foreshadowing the impact of the new evidence that will be introduced later.
For example, in a typical post-conviction case, almost all of the core
facts of a crime can be told from the perspective of the investigation and pretrial interviews. This story can use citations to the trial record but should try
to be faithful to the perspective and chronology of the investigation as it actually unfolded. Again, this is often easier if the writer has gone beyond the
trial record to police reports and other contemporaneously created records.
With this background, the narrative of the trial can be narrower. Trial
is rarely about actual fact-finding, but instead about how each side marshals
its facts to create its story. Thus, the trial narrative should not be a retelling
of the crime—it is a story about the narratives themselves. The description
of trial can be brief, with a broader perspective about each side’s arguments.
Retelling of facts should be limited to specifying which facts presented at
trial differed greatly from the investigation. Opening and closing arguments,
in particular, are invaluable sources for each side’s story—for discovering
what each side wanted to—and was able to—tell the jury about what the facts
meant.
D. Introducing New Evidence Naturally in the Narrative
With a proper lead-up, the new evidence can be introduced at the conclusion of the narrative, without hyperbole, and with just brief reminders of
how it impacts the story. This evidence should assimilate into the narrative
naturally, and its impact should be as apparent as possible. Of course, part
of the effect of the twist is that it gains value from a reconsideration of the
earlier facts,104 and the impact of the new evidence can be analyzed at length
in the body of the brief. But introducing the new evidence should not require
fully retelling its place in the story. If it does, then either the initial story was
not properly set up, or the new evidence is simply not very strong. As Tobin
puts it:
The rule for this effect [in fiction] is that the ‘solution’ or revelation should seem, in hindsight, to fit naturally with the information
otherwise presented. Conveniently, our curse of knowledge bias
104. Tobin, supra note 77, at 168.
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encourages this very interpretation. Provided that the revelation
seems reasonable, consistent, and appropriate enough that the
reader can accept it as a plausible outcome of or explanation for
the previously narrated events, the curse of knowledge will enhance the effect, making the revelation seem retroactively obvious
and inevitable. It can make a good-enough fit feel exactly right.105
Introducing new evidence properly can help take control of the cognitive biases that unfairly disadvantage criminal defendants and present a more
accurate and compelling post-conviction narrative.
V. CONCLUSION
A defendant charged with a crime who wants to create the predominant
narrative faces several challenges. Racial biases may pose an initial hurdle
to the creation of a persuasive story. The defendant’s efforts will be opposed
by a prosecution team that controlled the timing of the initiation of charges
and was thus able to settle on a narrative before litigation. At trial, the prosecution team has several other structural advantages, including the ability to
present its narrative first, forcing the defense team to wait to respond until
the story may have already been accepted as true by the trier of fact. These
advantages carry on into appeals, where a reviewing court bases its decision
on a record that is the product of the prosecution team’s inherent narrativecreating advantages. In the post-conviction context, defense counsel must
make special efforts, including the intentional discarding of earlier narratives,
the use of a single perspective to introduce core facts of a case, and the careful
weaving of newly available evidence into the narrative, to unravel the prosecution’s narrative and intentionally rebuild it around a complete version of
the facts. In this way, the defense can untell the prosecution’s story, undoing
the acceptance of a false narrative and, hopefully, reversing a wrongful conviction.

105. Id. at 168–69.

